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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

JOB FUNCTIONS, STANDARDS, AND ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER
THE ADA: RECENT EEOC DECISIONS

E. PIERCE BLUE*
I. INTRODUCTION
What the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 requires of employers,
in one word, is flexibility. The law insists that employers reconsider standard
practices and methods of performing jobs in light of an individual with a
disability’s unique abilities and skills.
In some areas of employment, this message has been received and readily
accepted. Employers understand that the ADA might require them to modify
their facilities (e.g., a heightened desk for a person in a wheelchair) or provide
additional services or equipment to enable persons with disabilities to perform
jobs (e.g., a screen reader for a person with a visual impairment).
In other areas, however, there is still resistance to the modifications that
the ADA requires. This resistance is particularly acute in relation to physical
job requirements and attendance standards.
The symposium jointly convened by the Saint Louis University Center for
Health Law Studies and William C. Wefel Center for Employment Law
focused on disability rights and the health care workforce. As my co-panelist,
Professor Nicole Porter, noted, work in the health care field is particularly
challenging for persons with disabilities precisely because health care jobs
often have rigid physical requirements and attendance policies. 2 This essay
describes three recent decisions from the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) in the federal sector that
discuss how these policies should be evaluated under the ADA: a case
involving a vision standard applied to an applicant to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), 3 a case challenging a rotating shift policy used by the
* E. Pierce Blue currently serves as an Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Chai R. Feldblum of
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This essay contains only the
opinions of the author. It does not reflect the views of Commissioner Feldblum or the EEOC
generally.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
2. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, The Difficulty Accommodating Healthcare
Workers, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2015).
3. Nathan v. Holder, Decision No. 0720070014, 2013 WL 3965241 (E.E.O.C. July 19,
2013).
19
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Customs and Border Patrol, 4 and a case where a worker in the United States
Postal Service (USPS) disputed the validity of a lifting standard. 5
These cases broadly reinforce the need for flexibility in the application of
general policies to persons with disabilities. They also highlight the importance
of properly classifying policies. The ADA is an intricate law and it establishes
a number of different defenses for different types of employment standards. 6
The manner in which a policy is labeled and defended, as these cases show,
can have a vast impact on the protections available under the ADA to a person
with a disability.
II. THE EEOC IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR
The readers of this essay can be forgiven for asking what the author is
talking about when he mentions EEOC decisions in the federal sector. The
EEOC’s role in adjudicating complaints of employment discrimination by
federal employees is one of its lesser appreciated functions.
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[a]ll personnel
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . shall be made
free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 7 The statute further states that the EEOC “shall have [the] authority to
enforce the provisions . . . of this section through appropriate remedies . . . and
shall issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary
and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this section.” 8 Section

4. Petitioner v. Johnson (Alvara), Decision No. 0320110053, 2014 WL 3571431 (E.E.O.C.
July 10, 2014).
5. Complainant v. Donahoe (USPS), Appeal No. 0120080613, 2013 WL 8338375
(E.E.O.C. Dec. 23, 2013).
6. For example, if an entity claims that an individual is not qualified because that person
cannot perform an essential function of a position, with or without accommodation, the entity
must establish that the function is essential and not marginal. See Regulations To Implement The
Equal Employment Provisions Of The Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)
(2015) (listing reasons why a job function may be considered essential). If the entity chooses to
deny a request for accommodation because of the impact such accommodation will have on its
finances or operation, the entity must meet the undue hardship defense. Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). And if an entity believes that a
person is not qualified to perform a job because she or he cannot meet a qualification standard,
including a safety standard, the entity must show that the standard is job-related and consistent
with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(6)-12113(b)-(c) (2012).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2012). The statute originally gave
the Civil Service Commission the authority to enforce this provision. That authority was
transferred to the EEOC through President Carter’s Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978. See
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at § 1366
(2006), and in 92 Stat. § 3781 (1978).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).
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501 of the Rehabilitation Act grants the EEOC the same authority over claims
of discrimination on the basis of disability. 9
The Commission enforces these responsibilities through what is known as
the “1614 process,” named for the section of the Code of Federal Regulations
where it resides. 10 The 1614 process has three basic components. The first
occurs in the agency. If an employee or applicant believes he or she was
discriminated against by the agency, the employee has forty-five days from the
discriminatory event to make contact with an agency equal employment
opportunity (EEO) counselor. 11 The employee works with the EEO counselor
to either resolve the complaint or file a formal charge of discrimination. 12 If
the employee or applicant elects to file a formal charge, the agency investigates
the complaint and produces a Final Agency Decision (FAD) on its merit. 13
After a FAD is issued, the employee/applicant can appeal the decision to
the EEOC. 14 The Commission will invite briefs from the parties and issue a
written decision based on a de novo review of the record. 15 This is the final
step in the process for the agency—the agency does not have the right to
appeal a Commission decision. An employee or applicant, however, retains the

9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794a (2012). Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that
each federal agency shall “provide[] sufficient assurances, procedures and commitments to
provide adequate hiring, placement, and advancement opportunities for individuals with
disabilities.” 29 U.S.C. § 791(b). That commitment includes both an affirmative action
component and a nondiscrimination component. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204 (2015). For complaints of
nondiscrimination, section 501 states that the “standards used to determine whether this section
has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.” 29 U.S.C. § 791(g). Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act instructs that
the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . .
shall be available” to complaints under section 501. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1).
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1614 (2015).
11. Id. § 1614.105(a)(1).
12. Id. §§ 1614.105-.106.
13. Id. §§ 1614.108-.110. I am trying to summarize the process, so I have simplified certain
elements of it. The requirements of an investigation are quite onerous and the applicant/employee
also has the option of requesting a hearing and recommended decision from an EEOC AJ in place
of an agency investigation. The agency, however, is always responsible for issuing a final
decision on the complaint. Persons interested in the specific requirements of the federal sector
complaint process should consult the Commission regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.
14. Id. § 1614.110.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.401-.405. Most decisions from the Commission are issued by the
Director of the Office of Federal Operations under authority delegated to that office. Id. §
1614.405(a). A select few are issued after consideration by the full Commission. Decisions from
either source are precedential and reflect Commission policy, though decisions from the
Commission often involve novel questions of law. Each of the cases discussed in this essay were
issued by the Commission.
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right to file a suit in federal court if he or she is unhappy with either the FAD
or an appellate decision from the Commission. 16
These decisions often provide unique insights on the Commission’s policy
positions. Unlike guidance or regulations, appeals require the Commission to
apply general policy to specific factual scenarios. And, most important for
purposes of this essay, they require the Commission to step into the role of a
court and show how it would evaluate the legality of certain actions under Title
VII, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), or the ADA.
III. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Consistent with its broad protective purpose, the ADA provides few limits
on reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities. The statute
defines accommodation through examples, such as “making existing facilities
. . . accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” and “job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices . . . and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 17 EEOC guidance
broadly describes accommodations as, “any change in the work environment or
in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a
disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities.” 18
There are only three instances where accommodation of a person with a
disability is explicitly not required under the ADA. The first is when the
requested accommodation is not “reasonable” in the first instance. 19 The
statute does not define “reasonable,” but, according to the Supreme Court, a
request is reasonable if it is “feasible” or “plausible” in the run of cases. 20 The
second is when an accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” on the
operations or finances of the employer. 21 Employers can deny reasonable
accommodations if they impose significant administrative difficulty or
expense. 22 The third is when the person requesting the accommodation is not
“qualified” to perform the job. 23 A person is qualified for a job if he or she
“satisfies the requisite . . . job-related requirements of the employment position
such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015).
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
Id. at 401-02.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2015).
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accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 24 This
means that the person must be able to complete the essential functions of the
job either unaided or with the assistance of reasonable accommodation. If a
person cannot complete an essential function, that person is not qualified. The
entity does not have to change the function or relieve the person of the duty to
perform it as an accommodation. 25
In cases involving physical job requirements or attendance standards, the
qualified inquiry is crucial. Employers often argue that these requirements or
standards should be considered essential job functions. 26 If that argument is
accepted, then an employee with a disability that prevents him or her from
meeting a standard is not qualified for the job, even if he or she is otherwise
able to perform the job. Once the standard is framed as an essential function,
the employer is no longer required to consider alternative standards or methods
of measuring performance that the person with a disability might be able to
meet. In some cases, the acceptance of certain physical job requirements as
essential functions can result in the automatic exclusion of a whole class of
persons with disabilities from certain jobs. 27
A second important issue in the qualified inquiry is the scope of
accommodations to “qualification standards.” 28 The ADA prohibits employers
from:
[U]sing qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria
that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of
individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria,

24. Id.
25. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n).
26. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 766 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Ford
successfully argued that an employee who had requested the ability to telework could not meet
the essential function of predictable on-site job attendance and was therefore not qualified to
perform the job. Id.; see, e.g., Samper v. Providence St. Vincent, 675 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (9th
Cir. 2012). Providence St. Vincent successfully argued that a nurse in the neonatal intensive care
unit was not entitled to an accommodation that exempted her from the essential function or
regular, predictable attendance. Id.
27. For example, in a case involving a deaf employee working in a photography studio, the
Tenth Circuit found that “verbal communication” was an essential function of the employee’s
position. See EEOC v. The Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985-87 (10th Cir. 2012). That, of
course, meant that the plaintiff (and many other individuals with deafness) was categorically
unqualified to perform the job. It seems unlikely, and contrary to the intent of the ADA, that all
persons who are unable to communicate verbally are unable to be photography assistants. For a
better example of a court considering the abilities of individuals with deafness, see Keith v.
County of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 924-27 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that a lifeguard with deafness
could be otherwise qualified to perform the job).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (2015).
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as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in
29
question and is consistent with business necessity.

The statute frames the defense to a charge of discrimination based on the
application of a qualification standard as requiring a showing that the standard
is “job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance
cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.” 30
That last phrase, “and such performance cannot be accomplished by
reasonable accommodation” is grammatically murky. 31 It could refer to the
standard itself or it could refer to the performance of the function to which the
standard is tied. For example, if an employer requires that employees meet a
certain vision standard and the employer is able to show that the requirement is
job-related and consistent with the business necessity for the position in
question, is an applicant only qualified if there is an accommodation that
permits him or her to meet that vision standard? Or, can the applicant argue
that he or she is able to perform the job despite not being able to meet the
standard?
EEOC guidance documents, 32 litigation, 33 and amicus briefs 34 touch on
these issues, but they are also dealt with comprehensively in EEOC federal
sector cases. Three such cases are detailed in the sections below: Alvara v.
Johnson, 35 where the Commission discussed the difference between an
essential function and an attendance standard; Complainant v. USPS, 36 where
the Commission assessed a physical job requirement as a qualification standard

29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2015); Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n, No.
915.002 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2002), www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommoda
tion.html.
33. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-13742, 2012 WL 3945540, at *5-7 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 10, 2012); EEOC v. The Picture People, Inc., No. 09-cv-02315-PAB-CBS, 2011 WL
1754522, at *1, *5 (D. Colo. May 9, 2011).
34. See, e.g., Brief for the United States and EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffAppellant and Urging Reversal at 1-3, Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cty. Sch. Dist. No.
101, 666 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-35233) (discussing the availability of accommodations
to qualification requirements under the ADA); Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiffs-Appellees in Favor of Affirmance at 1-2, Bates v. UPS, 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007)
(No. 04-17295) (discussing the appropriate evaluation of qualification standards under the ADA).
35. Alvara v. Johnson, No. 0320110053, 2014 WL 3571431, at *1 (E.E.O.C. July 10, 2014).
36. Complainant v. Donahoe (USPS), Appeal No. 0120080613, 2013 WL 8338375
(E.E.O.C. Dec. 23, 2013).
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under the ADA; and Nathan v. Holder, 37 where the Commission described the
scope of accommodation in a qualification standard case.
IV. ALVARA V. JOHNSON: ATTENDANCE STANDARDS AS ESSENTIAL
FUNCTIONS
Mr. Alvara was employed as a Customs and Border Protection Officer for
the Department of Homeland Security. 38 Mr. Alvara’s facility operated twentyfour hours a day and officers were rotated in and out of different shifts,
including a “graveyard shift” that ran from 12:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m. 39
Officers were permitted to voluntarily swap shifts with co-workers if needed. 40
Mr. Alvara had a severe case of sleep apnea and required a consistent sleep
schedule. 41 He requested, and was initially granted, an exemption from
working the “graveyard” shift as an accommodation to his disability. 42 In
2008, however, a new manager ordered a comprehensive review of light duty
cases at the facility, including Mr. Alvara’s. 43 Mr. Alvara was told after the
review that he needed to return to working the “graveyard” shift, apply for
disability retirement, request an accommodation, or resign from his position. 44
Mr. Alvara requested the continuance of his prior accommodation, but his
supervisors determined that his inability to work the rotating shift made him
unqualified for his position. 45 He then filed a charge of employment
discrimination. 46
Mr. Alvara’s complaint was initially processed by the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB), a body responsible for enforcing the federal
government’s civil service merit protections. 47 Relying on an EEOC decision

37. Nathan v. Holder, No. 0720070014, 2013 WL 3965241, at *7-8 (E.E.O.C. July 19,
2013).
38. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *1-2.
43. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *1.
44. Id.
45. Id. at *2.
46. Id.
47. There is significant overlap between federal civil service laws that prohibit making
personnel decisions based on “non-merit factors” and federal equal employment opportunity
(EEO) laws. Cases that raise both a civil service law claim and an EEO claim are called “mixedcase appeals” and the complainant has the option of initially going through either the MSPB or
the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302 (2015). To ensure that one body is not misinterpreting the
law of the other, mixed case decisions can be appealed to whichever body did not initially hear
the case. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.161(c), 1201.162(a) (2015). When the two bodies disagree on the
interpretation of a law a “Special Panel” consisting of one representative from MSPB, one
representative from the EEOC, and a neutral party appointed by the President and confirmed by
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from 2008, the MSPB found that working a rotating shift was an essential
function of Mr. Alvara’s job. 48 Since Mr. Alvara could not work a rotating
shift due to his disability, the MSPB found that he was not qualified for the job
and dismissed his complaint. 49 Mr. Alvara appealed that finding to the
EEOC. 50
The central question in the case was whether working a rotating shift was
an essential function of the Customs and Border Officer position at the facility
where Mr. Alvara worked. 51 The EEOC decision said definitively that it was
not, and further, that a standard related to when a job is performed could never
constitute an essential function under the ADA. 52
The decision’s reasoning on that point is relatively simple. According to
the Commission, “[e]ssential functions are the duties of a job, that is, the
outcomes that must be achieved by someone in that position.” 53 A rotating
shift is not an outcome of a Customs and Border Officer job. It is, instead, a
“method[] . . . by which a person accomplishes” the duties of a Customs and
Border Officer. 54 As a method of performing the job and not a fundamental
duty of the job itself, the requirement to work a rotating shift is subject to
accommodation—including a request like Mr. Alvara’s that the individual be
excused from meeting the requirement. 55 To view a requirement related to
when a person performs the job as an essential function, in the Commission’s
view, “leads to the perverse and unacceptable conclusion that any employee
with disability-related absences is an unqualified individual and, therefore,
unable to claim the protections of the [ADA].” 56
That finding was not the end of the Commission’s analysis though.
Rotating shift requirements and other standards related to when a person
performs a job might not be essential functions, but they are often important to

the Senate is convened to hear the case. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(d)(6)(A) (2012). The Panels are
rarely called, but, the MSPB asked for a Special Panel in this case after reviewing the
Commission’s decision. The Panel ultimately upheld the EEOC’s analysis as the question
decided—whether a rotating shift is an essential function—was solely within the EEOC’s
jurisdiction and was not an unreasonable reading of the law. See Alvara v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. DA–0752–10–0223–E–1, 2014 WL 0320110053 (Spec. Pan. Sept. 29, 2014).
48. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *3.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *1.
52. Id. at *4-5.
53. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *4.
54. Id.
55. Id. (“And, as with other methods by which a function is accomplished (e.g. lifting as a
method of transporting packages or use of certain software as a method of transcribing notes),
attendance and tuning are subject to the law’s obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation
that does not impose an undue hardship.”)
56. Id. at *5.
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the operation of a business. 57 As with other forms of accommodation, a
covered entity has the ability to show that providing an exception to a rotating
shift policy would impose an undue hardship on its operations or finances. 58
Examining the record, the Commission determined that the Department of
Homeland Security had not shown that accommodating Mr. Alvara’s request
would impose significant expense or operational difficulty. 59 The facility
where Mr. Alvara worked had approximately 700 officers. 60 Those officers
frequently exchanged shifts and the facility was able to accommodate requests
to not work certain shifts due to pregnancy, leave, training, and other reasons
(accommodations that the Department conceded were technically temporary
but could remain in place for extended periods of time). 61 It was also
uncontested that the facility was able to accommodate Mr. Alvara for a year
without issue. 62 The Department was only able to put forward generalized
concerns about the impact that accommodating Mr. Alvara might have on the
morale of other employees, evidence that is not specific enough to show undue
hardship. 63
The implication of this decision for attendance standards in general is
obvious. According to the Commission, these standards are never essential
functions. 64 They are instead job standards related to when and how a person
performs the essential functions of a job. 65 As such, a person with a disability
can request that they be modified or waived. But the mere fact that a person is
able to request such an accommodation does not mean an employer must
provide it. The employer can still show that granting that accommodation to
the person requesting it would impose an undue hardship on its finances or,
more likely, operation.
V. COMPLAINANT V. USPS: PHYSICAL JOB-REQUIREMENTS AS
QUALIFICATION STANDARDS
The Complainant in this case bid for a position as a Sales, Services, and
Distribution Associate (SSD Associate)—essentially a front desk employee—
in a branch of the Denver Post Office. 66 She was denied the position because a
persistent shoulder injury prevented her from lifting more than ten pounds and
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
2013).

Id.
Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Alvara v. Holder, No. 0320110053, 2014 WL 3571431, at *7 (E.E.O.C. July 19, 2014).
Id. at *4.
Id.
Complainant v. USPS, No. 0120080613, 2013 WL 8338375, at *1-2 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 23,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

28

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 9:19

the Postal Service believed that lifting packages of seventy pounds or more
was an essential function of the SSD Associate position. 67
The first question before the Commission was whether the Postal Service
was correct in its description of the essential functions of the SSD Associate
position. 68 In a statement that was repeated in Alvara, the Commission found
that the “essential functions are the duties of a job – i.e., the outcomes that
must be achieved by the person in the position.” 69 The relevant outcome that
had to be achieved by a person in the SSD Associate position was “collecting
and distributing mail” brought in by customers. 70 The lifting standard was a
measure put in place by the Postal Service to determine if a person could
perform the job as they believe it had to be performed (i.e., the Postal Service
believed that a person had to lift up to seventy pounds to effectively collect and
distribute mail brought in by customers). 71 In that sense, the lifting requirement
was a qualification standard that screened out the Complainant on the basis of
disability. 72
Qualification standards are acceptable under the ADA if the covered entity
is able to show that the standard is job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 73 According to the Commission, the Postal Service could justify its
lifting standard by showing that:
(1) . . . the standard, criteria, or test is ‘job-related and consistent with business
necessity;’ and (2) . . . that there is no accommodation that would enable the
person to meet the existing standard or no alternative approach (itself a form of
accommodation) through which the employer can determine whether the
74
person can perform the essential function.

The Commission further stated that “[w]hen determining if a standard or
test is job-related and consistent with business necessity, the central question is
whether the standard or test is ‘carefully tailored to measure [an individual's]
actual ability to [perform] the essential function of the job.’” 75 In this instance,
the Commission found that the standard was not carefully tailored. 76 It cited
evidence in the record from a variety of Postal Service employees and officials
indicating that lifting seventy pounds was only rarely required and that SSD
Associates only “frequently” lifted packages between twenty and thirty
67. Id. at *4, *7.
68. Id. at *6-7.
69. Id. at *7.
70. Id.
71. Complainant v. USPS, 2013 WL 8338375, at *7.
72. Id. at *7-8.
73. Id. at *8.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. 101-485 (II) at 36, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 353-5).
76. Complainant v. USPS, 2013 WL 8338375, at *8.
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pounds. 77 That evidence might “support[] a finding that a lifting requirement
of 35 pounds would be carefully tailored to measure the Complainant's ability
to perform the essential functions of a Sales and Distribution Associate at the
Glendale facility.” 78 But it was “far from sufficient for the required showing by
the Agency that its requirement that Sales and Distribution Associates be able
to lift up to 70 pounds met this standard.” 79 As the Postal Service had failed to
justify the standard it used to screen out the Complainant, the Commission
found that it had discriminated against the Complainant on the basis of
disability. 80
According to this decision, a lifting standard is best considered a
qualification standard and not an essential function under the ADA, as the
standard relates to the method by which a person achieves an outcome and is
not an outcome in and of itself. If an employer uses a lifting requirement to
disqualify a person with a disability from employment, the employer must be
prepared to demonstrate that requirement is job-related and consistent with
business necessity as applied to that person or “carefully tailored to measure
[an individual’s] actual ability to [perform] th[e] essential function of the
job.” 81
This interpretation is at odds with how courts tend to examine these
requirements. In a quick search of the ADA case law, one can find a number of
cases analyzing whether a lifting requirement is an essential or marginal
function under the ADA, 82 but there are almost no cases analyzing lifting as a
qualification standard. 83 This is largely because plaintiffs have framed their

77. Id.
78. Id. at *9.
79. Id. The Commission further noted that “[u]ndoubtedly, the Agency may have been able
to justify a qualification standard that tied a lower lifting requirement to these essential functions.
But the Agency did not utilize a lower standard and hypothesizing about which standards might
be sufficient would be speculation on our part.” Id.
80. Id.
81. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 353-54 (1990).
82. See, e.g., EEOC v. Womble Carlyle Sandbridge & Rice, LLP, No. 1:13-CV-46, slip op.
at 8, 9 (D.N.C. June 26, 2014); Fornes v. Osceola Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 179 Fed. App’x 633, 635
(11th Cir. 2006); Dropinski v. Douglas County, 298 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2002); Phelps v.
Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001); Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 931
(7th Cir. 2001); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1998); Ingerson v.
Healthsouth Corp., No. 96-6395, slip op. at 2 (10th Cir. 1998); Brickers v. Cleveland Bd. Educ.,
145 F.3d 846, 849-50 (6th Cir. 1998).
83. The only decision I could find that even indirectly addressed the issue was an unreported
order recommendation from a magistrate judge in the Northern District of Illinois that denied a
jury instruction that framed a lifting requirement as a work standard. Kohnke v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., No. 93 C 7096, 1995 WL 478858, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Interestingly, the magistrate
rejected that framing because he felt job-relatedness was a lower bar than showing that job duty is
an essential function. Id.
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challenges this way. In fact, in Complainant v. USPS, both parties had
addressed the lifting requirement as an essential function. 84 The Commission
corrected that interpretation, saying that:
Both the Complainant and Agency are mistaken about the central issue in this
case. The specific lifting requirement imposed by the Agency is not an
essential function of the position. Rather, it is a qualification standard that has
been established by the Agency in order to ensure that employees can perform
85
the essential functions of the job.

Examining a lifting requirement under the qualification standard test
instead of looking at it as a job function has profound implications for the
ADA. As the analysis in Complainant illustrates, the evidence required to meet
the first step in the job-related and consistent with business necessity defense
will look similar to the evidence required to show that a job function is
essential. The evidence required by both tests relates largely to how a job is
actually performed and whether that performance is consistent with the lifting
that the employer says is required to perform the job. 86 But an employer
defending a qualification standard has to make an additional showing. It must
show that “such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation.” 87 As noted above, the EEOC read this in Complainant as
requiring a showing “that there is no accommodation that would enable the
person to meet the existing standard or no alternative approach (itself a form of
accommodation) through which the employer can determine whether the
person can perform the essential function.” 88 The employee or applicant can
propose an alternative method of performance or measure of performance that
he or she meets even if the employer can demonstrate that the standard is
carefully tailored to measure job performance. 89 When a lifting standard is
viewed as a job function, however, the analysis ends after a finding that it is an
essential function. If the employee is unable to meet it, then by definition, they
are unable to perform the job and are not qualified under the ADA. The
Commission’s interpretation in Complainant, therefore, provides additional
protections to persons with disabilities by extending the accommodation
requirement.

84. Complainant v. USPS, Appeal No. 0120080613, 2013 WL 8338375, at *4 (E.E.O.C.
Dec. 23, 2013).
85. Id. at *7.
86. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2015) (“Evidence of whether a particular function is
essential includes, but is not limited to: . . . (iii) the amount of time spent on the job performing
the function; . . . (vi) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) the current
work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.”).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012).
88. Complainant v. USPS, 2013 WL 8338375, at *8.
89. Id. at *8-9.
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VI. NATHAN V. HOLDER: ACCOMMODATIONS TO QUALIFICATION STANDARDS
The analysis in Complainant mentions the accommodation requirement in
the qualification standards defense, but it does not grapple with it in detail. The
Nathan case, however, offers a good illustration of the Commission’s view on
this topic. 90
Jeremy Nathan is an attorney and former officer in the United States
Army. 91 Mr. Nathan has monocular vision due to a detached retina that cannot
be surgically repaired. 92 His impairment was diagnosed during his service in
the Army and did not result in any restrictions on his military duties. 93 After
Mr. Nathan left the Army, he enrolled in law school. 94 Upon graduation he
applied to work as a Special Agent (SA) in the FBI. 95 The FBI denied his
application due to his monocular vision. 96 They argued that applicants had to
have uncorrected vision of 20/200 in each eye and corrected vision of 20/20 in
one eye and 20/40 in the other in order to safely perform the functions of a
SA. 97 Mr. Nathan, of course, could not meet this standard, but he argued that
his background in the Army and his experience in adjusting to his limited
vision made him able to safely perform the SA job. 98
The question before the Commission was whether the ADA required that
the FBI give Mr. Nathan the opportunity to demonstrate his ability to safely
perform the job in spite of his visual impairment. 99 Unlike the agencies in
Alvara and Complainant, the FBI did not argue that the vision standard was an
essential function of the job. 100 They argued instead that the vision standard
measured whether an applicant could safely perform the essential tasks of an
SA, such as “clearing a room” (quickly scanning an area to determine if any
threats were present). 101
The ADA states that a qualification standard “may include a requirement
that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals.” 102 EEOC regulations state that a covered entity must show that
the person with a disability poses a “significant risk of substantial harm to the

90. See, e.g., Nathan v. Holder, Appeal No. 0720070014, 2013 WL 3965241 (E.E.O.C. July
19, 2013).
91. Id. at *1-2.
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *2.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *7.
98. Id. at *10.
99. Id. at *9-10.
100. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *4.
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012).
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health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced
by reasonable accommodation” (often called the “direct threat defense”) in
order to justify excluding him or her from a job based on safety concerns. 103 A
determination that a person with a disability poses such a risk must be based on
an “individualized assessment” and rely on “reasonable medical judgment.” 104
Though this test obviously differs from the “job-related” defense laid out in the
statute, the two standards do not, as the Fifth Circuit noted in EEOC v. Exxon,
“present hurdles that comparatively are inevitably higher or lower but rather
require different types of proof.” 105
In Nathan, the Commission found that the FBI had not conducted the
individualized assessment required by the direct threat defense. 106 Specifically,
the FBI had relied on generalized evidence about the limitations of persons
with monocular vision and had failed to take Mr. Nathan’s specialized
experience into account when rejecting his application. 107 In addition, the
Commission stated that a review of Mr. Nathan’s skills on paper alone was not
sufficient. 108 The FBI was required to permit Mr. Nathan to actively
demonstrate how he was able to perform the SA job even in spite of his
monocular vision. 109 As the order attached to the decision reveals, the only
effective way for Mr. Nathan to make that showing would be to attend the FBI
training academy for new agents. 110 If he is able to pass, he will have
demonstrated his ability to safely perform the job using his experience and
acquired skills. 111
Despite the fact that the Nathan decision discusses the direct threat defense
and not the job-related defense, it tells us quite a bit about the EEOC’s view on
how the accommodation requirement works under the job-related defense. As
the language quoted from the Exxon decision implies, 112 when considering a
safety standard, the difference between the direct threat and job-related
defenses is one of degree, not kind—particularly as the two are applied in
EEOC decisions. Both defenses require that the employer consider the standard
as applied to the individual and not just in general (i.e., the individualized

103. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2015).
104. Id.
105. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000).
106. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *10.
107. Id. at *9.
108. Id. at *9-10.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *10 (“Notify Complainant of the reporting dates of upcoming New Agent training
classes. The Agency shall allow Complainant 90 days notice between the successful completion
of his background investigation and the date on which he is required to report for New Agent
training. Complainant may request an earlier reporting date if one is available . . . .”)
111. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *10.
112. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000).
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assessment), and both require that the employer consider accommodations that
permit the individual to perform the job safely. The relief ordered in Nathan 113
demonstrates that when individuals with disabilities are unable to meet a
standard they have the right not only to suggest accommodations that enable
them to meet those standards, but they also have the right to show that they can
perform the job, with or without accommodation, in spite of the standard.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Alvara, Complainant, and Nathan provide three
significant insights. First, properly drawing the line between essential functions
and qualification standards is incredibly important to the operation of the
ADA. The essential functions of a position are the outcomes that a person in
that position must achieve. They are not the methods that a person uses to
achieve that outcome or the time at which the outcomes are achieved. Viewing
a requirement that dictates the method of job performance as an essential
function relieves the covered entity from the fundamental requirement of the
ADA—namely, rethinking the way in which a job is performed in order to give
persons with disabilities a chance to demonstrate their capabilities.
Second, reasonable accommodations to qualification standards are
permitted by the statute. If a qualification standard, like a vision test or a lifting
requirement, screens out a person with a disability, the employer needs to
consider both accommodations that enable the person to meet the standard and
alternative standards (or the waiver of the standard), so long as the person is
otherwise able to perform the job.
Finally, a finding that a physical job requirement or attendance standard is
not an essential function does not leave the employer defenseless. An employer
can show that accommodations to these policies impose an undue hardship on
its finances or operations, or challenge the effectiveness of any alternative
measure proposed by the employee or applicant. But, importantly, the
employer must be open to changes in these practices if those changes will
permit a person with a disability to successfully perform the job. Rote
application of a policy, and disqualification of persons with disabilities, is not
permitted.
Of course, these decisions only represent the view of the EEOC. The
courts have, to date, tended to go in a different direction. But the principles
announced in Alvara, Complainant, and Nathan are in line with the
fundamental mission of the ADA and deserve considered attention. The ADA
was meant to open up employment opportunities for persons with disabilities.
Many persons with disabilities are only able to perform jobs by using methods
that differ from the methods traditionally used by employees without

113. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *10, 14.
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disabilities. Having employers consider those alternative methods is how the
promise of the ADA is ultimately fulfilled.

